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ABSTRACT
This  paper  investigates  the  remarkable  extremes  of  growth  experiences  within  countries  and
examines the changes that occur when growth starts and stops. We find three main results. First, all
but the very richest countries experience both growth miracles and failures over substantial periods.
Second, growth accounting reveals that physical capital accumulation plays a negligible role in
growth take-offs and a larger but still modest role in growth collapses. The implied role  of
productivity in these shifts is also directly reflected in employment reallocations and changes in
trade. Third, growth accelerations and collapses are asymmetric phenomena. Collapses typically
feature reduced manufacturing and investment amidst increasing price instability, whereas growth
takeoffs are primarily associated with large and steady expansions in international trade. This
asymmetry suggests that the roads into and out of rapid growth expansions may not be the same. The
results stand in contrast to much growth theory and conventional wisdom: despite much talk of
poverty traps, even very poor countries regularly grow rapidly, and the role of aggregate investment
in growth accelerations is negligible.
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1.  Introduction 
  Since World War II, economic development has witnessed a few distinct 
“miracles” and a larger number of “failures”.  A few countries, such as Singapore and 
Botswana, experienced consistently high rates of growth. Meanwhile, many countries 
found themselves only modestly more developed, if not poorer, at the close of the 20th 
century then they were several decades before. Explaining the variation across countries 
has motivated an enormous range of research that seeks to unlock key mechanisms and 
causes of growth and draw lessons that can guide policy. 
  This paper explores a different approach to growth that emphasizes the variation 
of the growth experience within countries. We first show that growth “miracles” and 
“failures” appear to be ubiquitous at ten and fifteen year time scales, with only the very 
richest countries immune from these dramatic fluctuations. Despite talk of poverty traps, 
almost all countries in the world have experienced periods of growth lasting a decade a 
longer during which they appeared to be growing fast enough to converge to the United 
States. Conversely, nearly all countries have experienced sustained periods of abysmal 
growth.  
Given the ubiquity of these substantial shifts in growth, understanding the 
transitions between different growth regimes is a critical question.  In this paper, we 
employ growth accounting to investigate what actually occurs during the transitions.  In 
order to systematically identify the events to be studied, we identify structural breaks in 
the growth series for individual countries using the methodology of Bai and Perron 
(1998, 2003) and data from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2002).  
The analysis suggests that changes in the rate of factor accumulation explain 
relatively little of the growth reversals, especially for accelerations. Instead, the growth 
reversals are largely due to shifts in the growth rate of productivity. We find very similar 
results if we use independent data on electricity consumption to infer total capital 
utilization rather than relying on investment data from the national accounts. The 
electricity data not only implies that the results are not being driven by changes in the 
intensity with which capital is used, but also assuages potential concerns about the quality   2
of investment data. The results survive a host of robustness checks, including alternative 
methods of selecting break dates and excluding growth “recoveries” from the analysis. 
The weak role of capital accumulation in these growth transitions suggests an 
efficiency story. In fact, further analysis suggests that reallocations across sectors may be 
an important mechanism through which these productivity changes take place. 
Accelerations, for example, are coincident with major expansions in international trade 
(both imports and exports), which suggests that efficiency boosts may be coincident with 
sectoral reallocations to exploit a country’s comparative advantage. Both accelerations 
and decelerations are coincident with changes in the growth rate in the manufacturing 
labor force, suggesting reallocations into and out of higher-productivity manufacturing 
sectors.  
We also find that accelerations and decelerations are asymmetric events. 
Accelerations are associated with increases substantial increases in trade, and relatively 
little change in investment, monetary policy or levels of conflict. Decelerations, on the 
other hand, show much sharper changes in investment (though still explaining a modest 
portion of the growth transition), increases in monetary instability, and increases in 
conflict. This asymmetry suggests that the problem of sustaining growth – i.e., preventing 
a deceleration – is a different problem in kind from the problem of engineering a growth 
takeoff.  The roads into and out of rapid growth expansions are both well-trodden.  But 
they are different roads.  
  Given these results, we reconsider several popular ideas in growth.  Three main 
themes emerge.  First, the classic “poverty trap” is not a first-order description of the 
growth process. Simply, most countries, including very poor countries and most Sub-
Saharan African countries, have grown very quickly over some sustained period.  
Second, the missing role of investment in growth accelerations is inconsistent with many 
views of growth, particularly those that emphasize poverty traps, since most rely on 
investment mechanisms. One example is the big push view of development (Rosenstein-
Rodan 1943; Murphy et al. 1989). Institutional stories that emphasize property rights and 
credit constraints as essential obstacles to growth also seem inconsistent with these 
growth accelerations, if, as typically understood, improvements in property rights and   3
credit markets would accelerate growth by expanding aggregate investment. Third, the 
asymmetry in the mechanics of collapses and accelerations poses a challenge to many 
unified models of growth. The limited set of existing models that feature medium-run 
cycles generally do not possess the types of asymmetries found in the data.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents benchmark 
facts that characterize the variation in growth within countries. Section 3 applies the Bai 
& Perron (2003) methodology to identify structural breaks in growth. Section 4 employs 
growth accounting to investigate the mechanics of growth takeoffs and collapses and also 
considers plausible sources of efficiency gains. Section 5 considers the existing 
theoretical literature in light of the facts presented here. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Growth Extremes within Countries 
  Several papers have argued that there is significant volatility in growth within 
countries and characterized aspects of this volatility.  Easterly et al. (1993), for example, 
showed that correlation of growth across decades within countries is very low – 
averaging only 0.3 in a worldwide sample. This implies that most of the variation in 
growth comes within individual countries, rather than across countries. Pritchett (2000) 
has categorized different growth regimes qualitatively, documenting “hills”, “plateaus”, 
and “mountains”, and suggested that countries typically feature abrupt and sustained 
changes in growth regimes rather than a consistent convergence process.  Building on 
these insights, the literature has recently begun to further investigate this volatility.
1 
  In this section we build on the existing literature by demonstrating the magnitude 
of the shifts in growth within countries. In the same way that cross-country comparisons 
                                                 
1 Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) show that the variation in growth rates in a sample of emerging markets is 
characterized by shifts in growth trends rather than variations in growth around a single trend. Ben-David 
and Pappel (1998) identify a statistically significant single structural break in the growth series for a broad 
set of countries. Jerzmanowski (2004) has built on Pritchett’s observations and estimated a Markov 
switching model between three different growth states, controlling for convergence effects. Hausmann et 
al. (2004) look at the empirical determinants of growth accelerations, and Easterly (2005) argues that these 
events are not driven by foreign aid or investment. For the OECD, a vast literature has also noted and 
sought to explain the growth slowdowns noted in the 1970s (e.g. Griliches 1980; Wolff 1996), and recent 
work has begun to examine medium-term fluctions in output in developed countries more generally (Comin 
and Gertler 2004).   4
do not capture the substantial part of growth variations, long-run averages within 
countries mask patterns of extreme success and extreme failure. In particular, we show 
that growth “miracles” and “failures” over ten year periods (and longer) appear within the 
historical experiences of most countries. 
  To begin, Figure 1 presents the best 10-year growth episode and the worst 10-year 
growth episode for all 125 countries in the Penn World Tables with at least 20 years of 
growth data.  Countries are ranked from the poorest to richest based on their income level 
in 1960.  For comparison, the graph highlights the best 10-year average in the United 
States (3.3% per annum) and the worst 10-year average in the United States (1.0% per 
annum). 
  Figure 1 indicates a remarkable degree of heterogeneity within national growth 
experiences, with sustained periods of both high and low growth.  Nearly all countries 
have experienced a growth episode substantially better than the U.S. best and a different 
episode substantially worse than the U.S. worst.  Moreover, extreme highs and extreme 
lows in growth are common across the income spectrum.  Only among the very richest 
countries is there a drop in the magnitude of the extremes. 
  The capacity of countries across the income spectrum to produce sustained 
episodes of high growth suggests that rapid increases in welfare have been within the 
reach of most economies.  This point is clarified in Figure 2, which compares the income 
level at the end of the best 10-year growth episode to the prior peak level of income.  We 
see that large income expansions are quite common.  In fact, 80% of the episodes show 
income expansions of at least 25%, with 50% showing expansions of at least 50% and 
many examples where per-capita income doubled or more.  Meanwhile, in only 6% of the 
cases do countries arrive at income levels equal to or below their prior peak.  The 10-year 
growth booms in Figure 2 are not simply recovery after bad episodes, but rather represent 
new growth.
2  The medium run variation in growth exposes large shifts in welfare. 
                                                 
2 Since the growth data is truncated (typically in 1960 for developing countries), it is possible that in some 
cases there is recovery from an un-witnessed pre-period.  However, when examining the subset of those 
growth accelerations in Figure 2 that come later in a country’s data series, we find similar patterns.  
Recovery has little to do with these 10-year growth booms.   5
  A different way to view these growth extremes is through the lens of 
convergence.  It is well known that income levels of poor countries have typically 
diverged from the wealthiest countries, with some notable exceptions (Jones, 1997; 
Pritchett, 1997).  For example, since 1960, among those countries with initially below 
median income, only 24% have grown faster on average than the United States while the 
other 76% have grown slower.  As indicated in Figure 1, however, the story over the 
medium run is considerably richer. 
  Table 1 analyzes whether countries have converged to US income levels and 
diverged from US income levels over 10-year periods. By convergence and divergence, 
we mean that average growth is higher or lower than average US growth over the same 
10-year period.
3 As before, the analysis includes all 125 countries in the Penn World 
Tables with at least 20 years of growth data.  The mean number of growth observations 
for all countries in this sample is 44, so 10 periods are typically about one-quarter of their 
growth history. 
  The striking fact is that 90% of all countries have converged on the US over some 
10-year period, while 94% have diverged over some 10-year period.  Dividing countries 
by region or by initial income level, we find that a high propensity for medium-run 
convergence and divergence are general phenomena.  Among the poorest 1/3
rd of 
countries in 1960, 92% have experienced a sustained episode of convergence.  Even the 
majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of which are considered long-run 
growth “failures”, have converged on the US over sustained periods.
4 
  These facts suggest that both miracles and failures in the medium run are within 
the experience of the same country – growth within countries is a “start-stop” process. 
Put another way, average growth over a 40-year period is typically a bad description of 
that country’s experience at any particular point in time. Understanding the variation 
within countries’ experiences can produce specific insights for theory and policy.   
                                                 
3 One might be concerned that convergence and divergence are made more likely due to U.S. growth 
volatility. However, as seen in Figure 1, similar results still obtain even comparing to the best and worst 
U.S. experiences. 
4 In results not reported, we find that convergence and divergence are also common over longer-periods.  
For example, 85% of countries experienced convergence and 87% experienced divergence over some 15-
year period.   6
 
3.  Identifying Regime Shifts in Growth 
   Multiple structural breaks in a growth series can be identified using the 
econometric methods of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003).  This section will identify these 
breaks and classify them into “up-breaks”, representing accelerations of growth, and 
“down-breaks”, representing growth collapses.  The following sections analyze the 
mechanics of these accelerations and collapses and relate them to existing growth theory.  
Other methods of determining identifying growth transitions will also be considered 
below. 
  The Bai and Perron method locates and tests for multiple structural breaks within 
a time series.  In our case, we look at a growth series within a country, 
  gt  = aR + et 
where gt is the annual growth rate in purchasing-power-parity per-capita income, aR is the 
mean growth rate during regime R, and et is an error term.  Data is taken from the Penn 
World Tables v6.1. 
  The intuition for the Bai and Perron method is straightforward.  First, an 
algorithm searches all possible sets of breaks (up to a maximum number of breaks) and 
determines for each number of breaks the set that produces the maximum goodness-of-fit 
(R
2).  The statistical tests then determine whether the improved fit produced by allowing 
an additional break is sufficiently large given what would be expected by chance (due to 
the error process), according to asymptotic distributions the authors derive. Starting with 
a null of no breaks, sequential tests of k vs. k+1 breaks allow one to determine the 
appropriate number of breaks in a data series.  Bai and Perron determine critical values 
for tests of various size and employ a “trimming” parameter, expressed as a percentage of 
the number of observations, which constrains the minimum distance between consecutive 
breaks.  For our main results, we focus on a specification with 10% asymptotic size and a   7
10% trimming parameter, although the main conclusions in following sections are robust 
to various choices.  We will employ a number of robustness checks as we proceed.
5 
  Since these are asymptotic tests while our time-series typically have between 40 
and 50 observations, we undertake a Monte-Carlo exercise to assess how accurately the 
Bai and Perron method detects breaks in synthetic data series of similar length.  In 
particular, we model a growth process with 40 years of data, an autocorrelation parameter 
of 0.1 (similar to what is present in actual growth data), and structural mean shifts equal 
to 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2 times the standard deviation in the error term.
6  Not surprisingly, the 
Bai & Perron method is more successful the larger the break.  For example, a single break 
2 standard deviations in size will be detected 91% of the time, but a single break 0.5 
standard deviation in size will be detected only 24% of the time.  The method is therefore 
conservative in detecting breaks, capturing only major accelerations and collapses.  We 
also find that the size of the test is appropriate in small samples, with a test that has 10% 
asymptotic size producing false positives in about 11% of the cases. 
  When implementing the Bai & Perron method on the real growth data, we detect a 
total of 73 structural breaks in 48 of the 125 countries that have at least 20 years of Penn 
World Table data.  We classify these breaks as either “up-breaks” or “down-breaks” 
depending on whether the average growth rate in the regime after the break is above or 
below the average growth rate before.  Table 2 lists the countries and years with 
structural growth breaks. Figure 3 presents four illustrative examples, plotting the log of 
PPP per-capita income over time for China, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire and Indonesia.  
Vertical lines mark the break years determined by the method, and we see that they are 
picking up substantial changes in growth rates – and well-known historical episodes.  The 
acceleration in China in 1978 is coincident with Deng’s ascension and an opening of the 
economy.  The collapse in 1973 in Mozambique follows the onset of major internal 
                                                 
5 The smaller the size parameter, the fewer the number of breaks, and the exact dates of the estimated 
breaks can shift within countries.  We have estimated the set of breaks using various size and various 
trimming parameters, and have also considered other estimation methods based on the Schwarz criterion of 
Liu et al. (1997) or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) of Yao (1998), as implemented by Bai and 
Peron (2003).  Bai and Peron argue that their method has superior properties under some circumstances 
than these other methods.  The behavior of economies in the vicinity of these breaks, examined in Section 
4, is robust to the break methodology and parameters (size, trimming) chosen. 
6 Bai & Perron (forthcoming) also present Monte Carlo results for finite samples, but their simulated 
samples sizes are larger then we have in our growth series; hence, we run our own simulations.   8
military conflict, and the turn-around in 1986 marks a sharp move away from Marxist 
economic policies and towards peace.  Indonesia’s growth begins with the Suharto’s 
ascension and defeat of the communists in 1967 and ends with the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997.  Cote d’Ivoire’s collapse in 1979 marks the end of the “Ivorian Miracle” as 
coffee and cocoa prices fall precipitously. 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics about these breaks.  First, we see that down-
breaks are somewhat more common than up-breaks, accounting for 59% of the cases.  
Second, structural breaks are common across regions of the world and widely different 
income levels – a fact that should not be surprising given the evidence of Figure 1.  If 
anything, we detect fewer breaks in very poor countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Third, structural breaks occur in all decades, although there is an unusual propensity for 
down-breaks in the 1970s, which is consistent with a large literature on the 1970s 
slowdown. 
 
4.  The Mechanics of Start-Stop Growth 
  In this section we use growth accounting techniques to analyze the mechanical 
sources of growth accelerations and collapses.  The standard assumption in growth and 
development accounting is a neoclassical production function with constant returns to 
scale in aggregate physical and quality weighted labor (e.g. Barro 1999a; Caselli 
forthcoming).  Here, we will generalize the standard production function slightly to 
include utilization parameters that account for possible changes in the intensity with 
which factors are used.  We write, 
  ) , , ( H K A F Y =         ( 1 )  
where K is aggregate physical capital in use, H is aggregate human capital in use – i.e. 
quality weighted labor, and A captures Total Factor Productivity (TFP), a measure of how 
efficiently the aggregate stocks are employed in the production of national output.  We 
further decompose capital stocks into two parts, 
  K u K K =    9
  H u H H =          ( 2 )  
where K  and H  are the total aggregate physical and human capital in the economy, and 
uK and uH are the intensity with which these factors are employed.  Since we are looking 
at medium-run changes in growth rates, it will be useful to relax the full employment 
assumption in standard growth accounting and attempt to estimate factor utilization as 











g g + + =       ( 3 )  
If factors are paid their marginal products, and output is exhausted in factor payments, 
then α ≡ FKK/Y is simply the capital share of income and FHH/Y=1- α is the human 
capital (labor) share of income.  In the analysis, we will assume α =1/3 as our main 
specification, although the implications of variations in this parameter will be 
considered.
7 
  Subtracting the growth rate of population from both sides of equation (3), and 
using equation (2) to decompose factor growth rates into growth in the total factor 
available and growth in the factor’s utilization, yields,
  () ( )
H K u u h k TFP y g g g g g g α α α α − + + − + + = 1 1     (4) 
where lower-case variables are averages per-capita. 
  Having identified structural breaks in the growth rate of per-capita income, gy, we 
use equation (4) to account for the sources of that structural change in growth.  The 
accounting exercise tells us whether observable factors, such as the accumulation of 
physical capital, human capital, or changes in factor intensity, can account for significant 
parts of the structural change, or whether TFP, the unobserved residual, is left to explain 
the growth breaks. 
  In the simplest specification, the utilization of existing factors can be incorporated 
as part of TFP.  This approach has been followed in studies that consider growth and 
                                                 
7 Gollin (2002) estimates income shares across countries and find that the traditional assumption of 
approximately 1/3
rd for the capital share is not unreasonable on average, although there is some variation.  
The implied estimates for the capital share lie mostly in a range between 0.15 and 0.4.    10
development accounting over large sets of developing countries (Easterly & Levine, 
2001; Hall & Jones, 1999).  Here we will consider the results of that approach, as well as, 
further below, the implications of specific controls for factor intensity using electricity 
consumption and labor force data. 




gk − − = δ         ( 5 )  
where I, gross investment, and n, the population growth rate, are taken from the Penn 
World Tables.  The depreciation rate, δ, is assumed to be 7%.
 8  The initial aggregate 
capital stock is determined by the perpetual inventory method.
9 
  Estimating the growth rate in human capital is more challenging because data is 
not available on an annual basis and methods for determining the human capital stock 
differ across authors.  We will focus on education and make the increasingly standard 
assumption of Mincerian returns to schooling, 
 
) (s r e h =  
where s is years of schooling.  We take r(s) = 0.1s, which implies a 10% return in wages 
to an additional year of schooling.




gh 1 . 0 =  
Using the Barro-Lee data set (2000), which presents panel data for average schooling 
data at 5-year intervals, we calculate the growth rate in human capital over each 5-year 
                                                 
8 Authors differ in their choices of the depreciation rate for aggregate capital, with 6% (e.g. Hall and Jones, 
1999, Caselli forthcoming), 7% (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 2001), and 10% (e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2004) among the typical choices.  We take 7% and will comment further on the role of this parameter 
below; our conclusions are not sensitive to this choice. 
9 The initial capital stock for each country in the Penn World Tables is determined assuming that 
investment grows in the unobserved pre-period at the same average rate as in the first ten years of the 
sample.  The core results are not sensitive to how the initial capital stock is imputed. 
10 Our conclusions will not be sensitive to any reasonable assumption about r(s) based on existing estimates 
of this function.  Essentially, human capital growth rates do not move sharply enough to have much 
explanatory power for structural breaks in growth; hence, fine tuning assumptions about human capital 
parameters and measures (see Psacharopoulos 1994; Bils & Klenow 2000) will not affect our results.     11
period using the trend in average schooling in the population of those at least 15 years in 
age.   
4.1 Factor Accumulation 
  Tables 4A and 4B present the basic results of growth accounting around the 
structural breaks defined in Section 3.  The first table considers “up-breaks” where the 
trend growth rate increases at the breaks, and the second considers “down-breaks” where 
the trend growth rate falls.  Each table considers both short-run growth accounting, 
comparing the 5-years before the break with the 5-years after the break, and medium-run 
growth accounting, where we compare behavior in the entire prior growth regime with 
behavior in the entire posterior growth regime.
11  
  The first panel of each table shows growth rates before and after the break. 
Looking first at the up-breaks, we see that the trend growth rate increases by an average 
of 7.2% per annum in the short run and 6.8% in the medium run.  These up-breaks on 
average mark the end of mild contractions (-1.8% per year) and the beginning of rapid 
expansions (+5.3% per year).
12  These are substantial changes with large implications for 
per-capita income. 
  The next panel of the table considers the role of physical and human capital 
accumulation in explaining these up-breaks.  The most striking result is that, while 
physical capital accumulation accelerates, this acceleration is very modest, increasing by 
only 1.5% in the short-run and 1.4% when looking over the entire regime.  Human capital 
accumulation is even more modest, seeing essentially no change.
13  
  The third panel of the table indicates how much of the change in growth is 
explained by factor accumulation. Given the modest changes in the growth rates of the 
                                                 
11 For up-breaks, the mean length of the growth regimes is 13.3 years prior to the break and 16.7 years after 
the break.  For down-breaks, the mean regime length is 19.7 years (prior) and 18.4 years (after). 
12 One potential concern is that these up-breaks represent recoveries from periods of negative growth, rather 
than true growth accelerations. However, as discussed in Section 4.5 below, the results are similar – and in 
fact show an even smaller change in capital accumulation – if we restrict attention to cases where growth in 
the pre-period was already positive. 
13 Recall that data for human capital is only available at 5-year intervals, leading to a slightly different 
approach than that used with the annual data.  The “short-run” for human capital compares growth rates in 
the last complete 5-year interval prior to the break with the first complete 5-year interval after the break.  
The regime averages consider growth rates over the longest period observable within the prior and posterior 
regimes.   12
physical and human capital, the answer is not very much.  Assuming the standard factor 
share for physical capital of 1/3, physical capital accumulation explains only 6.9% of the 
growth change in the short run and 7.1% in the medium run.  In other words, increased 
rates of capital accumulation – i.e. increased investment – do not play a substantial role in 
growth accelerations. 
  Table 4B considers “down-breaks” in growth.  As with growth accelerations, we 
see large changes in income growth rates:  a decline of 7.0% in the short run and 6.0% in 
the medium run.  These down-breaks on average represent the end of rapid expansions of 
about 5% per year and the onset of contractions of about -1.5% per year.  In this sense, 
they are the mirror opposite of the up-breaks.  Unlike the up-breaks, however, we now 
see a reasonably large decline in the rate of capital accumulation, by 4.0% in the short run 
and 4.6% over the regime averages.  Human capital, as before, shows only modest 
changes.
14 
  Given the more substantial decline in the rate of capital growth, factor 
accumulation can now explain a larger portion of the structural break in the growth trend.  
Assuming a capital share of 1/3, the contribution of capital is still somewhat modest – 
about 25% or 30%.  While modest, this effect is statistically much larger than seen in 
growth accelerations. 
Table 5 compares the results from the up-breaks and the down-breaks. For both 
up-breaks and down-breaks, we report a p-value from a one-sample t-test of the null 
hypothesis that there was no change in the growth rate of each variable across the break. 
We also report the p-value from a two-sample t-test of the null hypothesis that the 
changes were symmetric. As indicated in Table 5, these t-tests strongly reject the null that 
up-breaks and down-breaks are symmetric events.  
                                                 
14 Interestingly, human capital moves in the opposite direction of growth, with a slight acceleration in the 
rate of schooling.   13
4.2 Factor Utilization 
  The intensity of factor utilization, beyond total factor quantities, may be 
particularly important when examining short and medium run fluctuations in growth.
15  
In this section, we employ measures of labor force participation and electricity 
consumption to assess factor intensity. 
  The second panels of Tables 4A and 4B present changes in labor force 
participation (LFP) around structural growth breaks. Labor force participation, the ratio 
of total workers to the total national population, can serve as a measure for uH in equation 
(4). The data indicates only modest changes; neither up-breaks nor down-breaks appear 
to be related to swings in the intensity with which labor is employed, at least on the 
margin of the number of individuals.
16, 17  While labor force participation is not the ideal 
measure of labor intensity, electricity consumption measures can help with concerns 
about inadequate employment measures. 
  Analyzing electricity consumption data has two primary benefits in analyzing the 
mechanics of structural breaks in growth.  First, shifts in the intensity with which a given 
stock of physical capital is employed will be reflected in electricity consumption per unit 
of capital.  Second, the total amount of electricity consumption can capture the aggregate 
use of capital, incorporating both factor utilization and factor accumulation effects.  
Therefore, we can also use electricity consumption data as a substitute measure for the 
role of physical capital and reconsider growth accounting without relying on imputations 
of physical capital stocks from aggregate investment data. 
                                                 
15 Even over the longer run, changes in utilization may matter.  For example, labor force participation rates 
may shift substantially, as suggested in a study of East Asian growth miracles (Young 1995). 
16 Labor force participation is calculated from the Penn World Tables by comparing GDP per worker to 
GDP per capita.  The Penn World Table data come from the International Labor Organization, which is 
also the source of the employment data used in the World Development Indicators.  
17 Labor force measures include those unemployed who are actively seeking work, so changes in 
unemployment rates will not be reflected in changes in the labor force measures used here. However, the 
impact of shifts in unemployment rates on growth is unlikely to be large enough to explain the changes in 
growth we observe.  To see this, suppose there was a dramatic reduction in unemployment – say, from 25% 
to 10%. This would yield a one-time increase in output of plausibly no more than 15%, which assumes 
optimistically that capital is also idle and waiting for these workers, and that these workers find jobs that 
are equal to the average productivity of the already employed. By contrast, the mean expansion in output is 
5.2% per year for the 16.7 years in the medium-run, or an increase in output of 240% for the entire period. 
Thus the contribution of changes in unemployment is likely to be negligible.    14
  To focus on capital utilization, we define a linear relationship between electricity 
use and physical capital as 
  k Bu e K =          ( 6 )  
where e is electricity use per-capita.  The linear relationship finds support in regression 
analysis.
18  Then, 
  k e u g g g
K − =          ( 7 )  
so that the difference between electricity consumption and capital growth defines growth 
in the intensity of capital use.  Further, growth accounting can now be performed looking 
at electricity data in place of the imputed data on the capital stock.  With (7), the analog 
of equation (4) is: 
 ) )( 1 (
H u h e A y g g g g g + − + + = α α       ( 8 )  
Here the growth rate in electricity use is capturing changes in both the accumulation and 
utilization of physical capital. 
  The results of this capital utilization analysis are presented in Tables 4A and 4B, 
which show little change in capital utilization around either up-breaks or down-breaks.  
Note that electricity consumption moves in a similar manner as the imputed capital 
growth, for both accelerations and collapses, which helps reaffirm the imputed capital 
growth rates.  Combining the utilization results for capital and the labor force, we can 
recalculate the contribution of accumulation and utilization to the growth change.  The 
earlier conclusions are not altered by incorporating these utilization measures.
19 
                                                 
18 If we generalize equation (6) as 
ω ) ( k u B e K = , then we can estimate ω by running the following 
regression for a cross-section of countries, 
 
  ε ω + + = k B e log log log  
 
This regression assumes that unobserved variations in B and uK across countries are orthogonal to the per-
capita capital stock.  Under these assumptions, OLS confirms a linear relationship, estimating ω ˆ =1.04 
with a standard error of 0.04 and a remarkably high R
2 of 0.9 in 1995 data.  Results are very similar for 
other years. 
19 The electricity consumption data also helps inform labor utilization.  If workers are paired with 
machines, then the application of more labor should also be reflected in increased electricity consumption.  
If there is an unobserved labor effect, then it must be coming largely in industries that do not use electricity 
intensively.   15
  The primary conclusion is that capital accumulation and utilization do not appear 
to explain large portions of the change in economic performance.  Up-breaks in growth 
are little associated with changes in capital accumulation or intensity. Down-breaks are 
more closely associated with observable factors and particularly a collapse in physical 
capital accumulation and electricity consumption – yet still they explain no more than 1/3 
of the total change in growth.  Finally, as shown in Table 5, the asymmetry of collapses 
and accelerations appears real and statistically significant.   
4.3 Sources of Productivity Gains 
  Total factor productivity, as the residual in growth accounting, is left as the 
primary explanation for structural breaks in growth, particularly accelerations. The 
missing role of investment, as a negative result, can help substantially limit theory and 
policy, as we will discuss in Section 5 below. As is always the case when dealing with 
TFP, however, a natural question is where these changes in productivity come from.  
  Generally speaking, changes in TFP would come from the reemployment of 
existing factors in more or less productive combinations. A more precise view of the 
national production function would acknowledge, in place of (1), that aggregate output is 
the summation of the value of various outputs produced using different production 
processes.  Specifically,  
  ∑ =
j
j j j j j H K A F p Y ) , , ( 
where j represents different types of production. Increases in TFP could come from 
reallocating human and physical capital to the more productive processes, or 
alternatively, by increasing the productivity of a particular process. In this section we 
examine two types of effects that suggest that the reallocation of resources across sectors 
may be an important reason why TFP changes so dramatically across these growth 
breaks. First, we consider international trade.  Second, we consider shifts in labor 
employment by focusing on the manufacturing sector within countries.   16
4.3.1 International Trade 
  A basic source of efficiency gains may be increased trade openness, for classic 
Ricardian reasons among others.
20  The first panel of Table 7 shows changes in the trade 
share across up-breaks and down-breaks.  We see several important results.  First, the 
share of GDP that is traded rises substantially with up-breaks, by about 13% over a 5-
year period and by 25% over the regime average.  This large increase in trade is due, in 
equal parts, to expanding shares of both exports and imports in GDP, with no shift in the 
trade balance. 
 Incorporating  trade  expansions in growth accounting is difficult, since we do not 
observe sector-level panel data for these economies.  However, the trade literature has 
shown broadly that greater trade shares are associated with greater per-capita income. 
Taking Frankel and Romer’s (1999) instrumental variables estimates for the causal effect 
of the trade share, the 25% expansion in the trade share would imply a 50-75% expansion 
in per-capita income.  This type of calculation, while highly approximate, suggests that 
expanding trade may be a central feature of up-breaks in growth. 
   Meanwhile, growth collapses show no systematic changes in the trade share.  The 
average change is small and not statistically different from zero.  The two-sample t-tests 
presented in Table 6 confirm the asymmetry in the trade patterns between growth 
accelerations and collapses. We reject the hypothesis that trade share changes are of 
similar magnitude with well over 99% confidence. 
  Given the large trade expansions found with up-breaks, one may then ask whether 
these events are associated with terms of trade shocks, as suggested by Easterly et al. 
(1993).  Table 6 further shows that terms of trade changes are modest.  We see a small 
and statistically insignificant improvement in the terms of trade by about 6% with up-
breaks and an insignificant decline of about 2% with down-breaks.  Results for the 
immediate 5-year changes (not reported) are even more modest, showing only a 1.5% 
                                                 
20 Beyond the cross-sector reallocation of factors toward comparative advantage, openness may increase 
productivity through increased scale economies, enhanced technology spillovers, and efficiency 
improvements within tradable sectors (see Tybout 2000 for a review).  Micro-studies suggest that trade 
openness leads to productivity improvements through inter-firm reallocations within tradable industries 
(e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999, Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000) as well as intra-firm or intra-plant 
improvements in productivity (Pavcnik 2002; Fernandes 2003).   17
improvement with up-breaks a 0.5% decline with down-breaks.  The growth 
accelerations are not related to sharp changes in the terms of trade, suggesting that trade 
policy is a more likely driver of these changes than the luck of international prices.  
4.3.2 Manufacturing 
  There is a long-standing view that growth, particularly among poor nations, may 
come from moves out of agriculture and into manufacturing (e.g., Kuznets 1953; also 
Matsuyama 1992, Golin et al. 2002).  Manufacturing may be intrinsically more 
productive and may also provide learning-by-doing spillovers (e.g., Krugman 1987). We 
investigate labor reallocations into or away from the manufacturing sector using UNIDO 
panel data. In particular, we focus on changes in the growth rate of the manufacturing 
labor share (i.e., manufacturing labor divided by total employment in the economy.) 
  As reported in Table 6, structural growth breaks are associated with large shifts in 
the accelerations or decelerations in the allocation of labor to manufacturing. For down-
breaks, the growth rate of the share of the population in manufacturing drops by 4.8% per 
year. Conversely, for up-breaks, growth in the manufacturing labor share accelerates by 
3.6% per year. This suggests that there may be substantial changes in the rate of sectoral 
allocations associated with these breaks.
21  The changes in the growth rate of 
manufacturing output exceed the changes in national output and confirm that these shifts 
in labor into and out of manufacturing were also associated with changes in overall 
manufacturing output of the same direction. 
   We can also look at the 9 2-digit SIC sub-sectors that collectively constitute the 
manufacturing sector.  In results not reported, we find that up-breaks see increased 
manufacturing employment as a fraction of economy-wide employment in 8 of the 9 sub-
sectors, with increased output growth rates in all 9 sub-sectors.  For down-breaks, the 
employment share and output growth rates fall on average in all 9 sub-sectors.  Regime 
shifts therefore see broad moves into and out of manufacturing rather than intra-
manufacturing reallocation.  Interestingly, as shown in Table 7, there is slightly more 
                                                 
21 While in theory this could reflect a change in overall unemployment, rather than the share in 
manufacturing, as discussed above, these changes are too large to be due to a one-time change in overall 
unemployment.   18
movement in the manufacturing of advanced products than in simple products, which 
may suggest particular productivity gains.
22, 23 
  Overall, the results in this section – showing dramatic changes in trade associated 
with up-breaks and substantial moves into and out of manufacturing associated with both 
types of breaks – provide additional evidence that changes in the allocation of resources 
lie behind the changes in growth. The changes in efficiency we observe may be driven in 
large part by reallocations of resources towards and away from higher productivity 
sectors. 
4.4 Associated Changes  
  The previous analysis has demonstrated the presence of structural growth breaks 
and documented the primary role of changes in productivity in these events.  To improve 
our understanding of structural growth breaks, it is also useful to consider how other 
important variables behave around these events. We consider three types of variables – 
variables that reflect the country’s monetary policy, the level of conflict (either internal or 
external), and the country’s institutions.  The purpose of this section is not to make 
statements about the direction of causality between the events examined here and the 
dramatic changes in growth we observe; rather, by examining how other variables change 
during these transitions, we will be able to further our understanding of what these events 
actually entail. 
  To examine price stability, we examine changes in the growth rate of the GDP 
deflator (i.e., the inflation rate).as well as changes in the growth rate of the nominal and 
real exchange rates. The results are presented in Table 7. The table shows that down-
breaks are associated with substantial increases in inflation. In fact, the point estimates 
suggest an average 14 percentage point increase in the inflation rate across down-breaks. 
                                                 
22 The “simple” sectors include food, clothing, and textiles (what Tybout (2000) calls “light 
manufacturing”) as well as wood products, furniture, and paper products (SIC codes 311-342).  The 
“advanced” sectors include chemicals, rubber and plastic products, metal products, machinery, transport 
equipment, and professional and scientific equipment among others (SIC codes 351-385).  The split 
between simple and advanced manufacturing is about 60%-40% for the labor employment share and 55%-
45% for the output share on average for the countries in the sample. 
23 Given that capital accumulation and electricity consumption rise little with up-breaks, the broad if often 
insignificant increases in manufacturing employment shares and output with up-breaks suggests a further 
retargeting of investments and electricity use in line with a productivity-based story.   19
This includes a number of hyperinflation episodes (e.g. Brazil, Zaire, and Nicaragua), as 
well as a large number of increases in inflation in the range of 10-30% per year. Overall, 
of the 39 down-breaks in the sample, 33 show increases in inflation. The results for 
exchange rates show that the nominal exchange rate also adjusts (through devaluation) 
during these episodes, so that real exchange rates remain approximately constant. Note 
that the typical contraction would present deflationary pressures rather than inflationary 
ones, which suggests that the inflationary price instability is more likely to be a cause 
than a consequence of the contraction.  Up-breaks, by comparison, show very modest 
(and statistically insignificant) declines in inflation. In fact, examining the data country-
by-country, only two (Mexico and Indonesia) of the 23 up-breaks are associated with 
substantial declines in inflation. 
  A second, relevant factor in producing these dramatic shifts in growth may be the 
beginning or end of violent conflict. To examine this possibility, we use annual conflict 
data from the PRIO / Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). The 
conflict variable takes a value of 0 if there is no conflict, 1 if there is a minor armed 
conflict, 2 if there is a intermediate armed conflict, and 3 if there is a major armed 
conflict.
24 We examine changes in two variables, one that captures all conflicts and one 
restricted to internal conflicts. The results in Table 7 confirm that conflict may play an 
important role for down-breaks.
25 For 7 of 41 countries, the down-break is almost exactly 
coincident with the outbreak of civil war. By contrast, growth takeoffs are not obviously 
related to reductions in conflict.  The coefficients suggest only mild decreases in conflict 
on average, and these decreases are far from statistically significant. 
Finally, we examine data on institutional quality using measures of corruption and 
the rule of law from Political Risk Services (see the description in Barro (1999b) for 
more detail). These measures range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the best outcome (least 
corrupt, strongest rule of law), and 0 is the worst. Although sample sizes on the rule-of-
law and corruption variables are small -- panel data is only available since 1982 -- the 
                                                 
24. Minor conflict is defined to be at least 25 deaths per year but no more than 1,000 total deaths; 
intermediate is defined to be between 25 and 1,000 deaths per year but no more than 1,000 total deaths; 
major is defined to be more than 1,000 deaths per year. 
25 Of course, both directions of causality are possible. Obviously, civil war can cause economic collapse, 
but Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) demonstrate that economic collapse can cause conflict as well.   20
results suggest little change.  Both up-breaks and down-breaks are associated with mild 
increases in the rule-of-law variable, with the up-break result not quite significant.  The 
corruption measures show no pattern. 
4.5 Robustness 
  In this section we consider the robustness of the growth accounting results to 
various assumptions.  We will discuss robustness to the set of break dates, concerns that 
accelerations may be “recoveries” rather than new growth, the implications of lagged 
investment effects, and assumptions about depreciation rates and return to scale. 
First, we consider the robustness of the results to the way we identify structural 
breaks in growth. To do so, we examine an entirely different and transparent method for 
defining growth breaks. In Tables 8A and 8B, we reconsider the basic growth accounting 
exercise around years that mark the maximum “acceleration” and “deceleration” within 
each country.  In particular, we calculate the change in growth across consecutive 10-year 
periods for every year in a country’s growth series and then define accelerations as the 
year in which the growth increase is greatest and decelerations as the year in which the 
growth decrease is greatest.  Tables 8A and 8B report the basic growth accounting results 
for all countries in the sample, as well as, separately, episodes where accelerations and 
decelerations were exceptionally large – by more than 5% per annum.  As is clear in the 
table, the results of this analysis are once again similar to the results using precisely 
identified dates of structural breaks.  Accelerations are at most weakly associated with 
increased investment or electricity use, while decelerations are coincident with more 
substantial declines in capital accumulation and electricity consumption.  
The results are further robust to variations in the structural break method.  Recall 
that the structural breaks in the main analysis were identified using the Bai and Perron 
method, with a size of 10% and a trimming parameter of 10%.  In results not reported, we 
have repeated the analysis using a variety of other size and trimming parameters and find 
consistent results. The consistency of the results across different sets of break dates 
suggests that the findings of the paper are likely to be quite robust to the particular 
methodology chosen.   21
A second, related concern is that the accelerations may be recoveries after bad 
growth episodes, rather than new growth. If this were the case, then the weak investment 
results may be less surprising.  In fact, however, the growth takeoffs in Table 4A 
represent new growth on average, with income 20% higher five years after the break than 
it was five years before.  In results not reported, we repeat the growth accounting using 
only those accelerations where growth in the pre-period was greater than 0%, as well as 
using other criteria to rule out recoveries.  That analysis show very similar results: capital 
accumulation plays a negligible role.
26 
  Third, a central result of our analysis is that capital accumulation plays little role 
in growth breaks, especially accelerations.  One possible objection to our method may be 
that capital investment may influence GDP with a substantial lag.  Then investment rates 
might rise prior to the growth break, making investment changes at the break itself an 
inappropriate gauge of capital’s impact on the transition.  However, such lag effects are 
unlikely to be important here for several reasons.  First, electricity consumption – a flow 
measure of capital use – is determined ex-post of any lag effects in installation and does 
not change at the up-breaks.  Second, unlike up-breaks, down-breaks are associated with 
substantial, simultaneous collapses in investment.  If lag effects were important, they 
would presumably be felt in both cases. Third, the up-break results are similar whether 
we look at 5-year periods or the longer regime-averages, yet the regime averages would 
be more immune to lag effects if they were important. 
  A fourth issue is the capital depreciation rate.  The greater the depreciation rate, 
the smaller the estimated capital stock, and smaller capital stock estimates will amplify 
the effects of investment changes.  Therefore, the greater the depreciation rate, the larger 
the change in gk around growth breaks.  In the analysis in Tables 4A and 4B, we choose 
δ=7%, but larger choices, such as 10% – which is very high – do not alter the basic 
results.  Moreover, the electricity approach to growth accounting in equation (8) is 
independent of any assumptions about capital depreciation, and the conclusions from that 
method are substantially the same. 
                                                 
26 This result is again confirmed when looking at growth in electricity consumption.  It is robust to many 
ways of defining growth accelerations – whether we use Bai and Peron under various specifications, the 
best 10-year growth differential discussed above, or other methods such as the growth expansion criteria in 
Hausmann et al (2004).   22
  Finally, a basic assumption in all growth and development accounting exercises is 
the shape of the production function, which is typically taken to have constant returns to 
scale.  Allowing increasing returns to physical and human capital will amplify their role 
and thereby reduce the role of TFP, altering the results.  In the analysis above, differing 
assumptions about the elasticity of output to human capital will have little effect on the 
growth accounting, since the changes seen in gh are modest.  The changes seen in gk are 
likewise modest for growth up-breaks; even with substantial positive spillovers to capital 
accumulation, we would have to reach beyond any standard theory or empirical evidence 
before the accumulation of physical capital played an important role in growth 
accelerations.  For down-breaks, the conclusion may be less clear:  the collapse in capital 
accumulation explains a modest portion of the down-break assuming a capital elasticity 
of 1/3 but virtually all of the down-break with an elasticity of 1. 
 
5.  Implications  
  A common view of development is that many poor countries stagnate and a 
minority experience sustained growth. Broadly speaking, this appears to be a good 
description of long-run trends in the data, either when looking at growth averages over 
the entire postwar period (e.g. Jones 1997) or over even longer horizons (Pritchett 1997). 
This stylized fact has led many to suggest that poor countries are in a poverty trap, where 
some intrinsic aspect of poverty itself prevents growth. Unlike the standard neo-classical 
growth model, poverty trap models all feature some type of non-convexity in the 
aggregate production function, which generates multiple stable equilibria (e.g. Murphy et 
al. 1989). This type of argument has been used historically to justify large-scale 
government investments to escape from the trap (Nurkse 1953, Gerschenkron 1965), is 
the rationale for much modern work in development economics, and has recently been 
brought again to the fore of macroeconomic policy debates on how to eliminate global 
poverty (Sachs, 2005). 
  The evidence presented here, however, conflicts with several aspects of this view. 
First, just because countries are diverging on average does not mean that a particular 
country is ‘stuck’ in a poverty trap without growth. Instead, most countries, including   23
most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, are capable of experiencing rapid growth. For 
example, in Figure 1 the average growth difference between a country’s best 10 years and 
worst 10 years is 7 percentage points for the poorest 90% of countries, which implies an 
income shift by a factor of two after only a decade. And, as discussed above, 90% of 
countries have experienced sustained growth for 10 years or more at a rate that put them 
on a path of convergence towards the United States. Only the very richest countries seem 
immune from these dramatic swings in growth. The issue is therefore not that poor 
countries are unable to grow at a rapid rate, but rather the probability that these growth 
episodes begin and the probability that they are sustained. While this point has been 
recognized to some extent in parts of the literature (e.g., Quah (1993, 1996), Kremer et al. 
(2001), and others), the view that poverty traps prevent countries from growing at all 
does not seem borne out in the data.  
Second, most views of poverty traps – even those that think about poverty traps 
probabilistically, rather than deterministically – focus on investment as the key 
component in the poverty trap. Models differ as to the source of the non-convexity in 
aggregate production, but in the typical model the non-convexity creates a steep region in 
the function translating capital in period t to capital in period t+1 (see the survey in 
Azariadis and Stachurski 2004).
27 Emerging from the poverty trap is therefore coincident 
with a burst of capital accumulation. The results presented here, by contrast, find little if 
any role for investment in major growth accelerations. Policies that focus on increasing 
aggregate investment do not appear to be addressing what has, at least historically, been 
critical to growth accelerations – increasingly efficient allocation of resources.  
The implications of this result are not limited to models of poverty traps, but also 
apply to growth models more generally. In a neoclassical growth model, growth in the 
long-run comes from improvements in TFP, while countries far from their steady state 
can grow largely through capital accumulation. The literature on decomposing the 
                                                 
27 Kraay and Radatz (2005) have taken an alternative approach to examining poverty traps by taking this 
non-convexity seriously and calibrating such models to fit the data.  Their calibrations suggest 
unreasonable parameter values, which they see as evidence against the existence of poverty traps.   24
relative roles of factor accumulation and TFP has focused primarily on the long run
28; the 
results in this paper suggest that TFP is much more important for growth than capital 
accumulation, even in the short and medium run – where factor accumulation could have, 
in theory, played a large role. 
To see the potential role for capital accumulation clearly, consider an economy 
initially in steady-state with a neoclassical production function and diminishing returns to 
capital, where α < 1 is the elasticity of income to capital, g is the growth rate in TFP, and 
δ is the depreciation rate. Then the instantaneous effect of an increased investment rate 
(s) on per-capita income growth (gy) is:
29 
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while the long run effect of an increased investment rate is zero, since in the long-run  
gy = g for any investment rate s. The instantaneous investment effect could therefore 
potentially be enormous if the percentage change in the investment rate, ∆s / s, is large. 
Therefore, while it is true a priori that capital accumulation cannot influence long-run 
growth rates in this standard model, it is conversely quite plausible that capital could play 
a leading role in the types of growth accelerations and collapses we examine here. Yet we 
find that, even for these dramatic short and medium run changes in growth, capital 
accumulation played only a very small role.  
Third, the asymmetries between accelerations and decelerations found in the data 
are not found in most models of growth. While models of poverty traps and growth 
volatility more broadly can have asymmetric features, few (if any) would predict 
accelerations driven almost entirely by changes in TFP and decelerations that feature at 
least some role for investment.
30 Moreover, the expansion of trade that occurs with 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Young (1995) on the importance of factor 
accumulation, and Hsieh (2002), Hall and Jones (1999), and Caselli (forthcoming) on the importance of 
TFP.  
29 The change in per-capita income growth due to a change in capital growth is simply ∆gY = α∆gK.  The 
instantaneous change in the rate of capital accumulation is ∆gK = ∆sY/K, which follows directly from the 
capital accumulation equation, dK/dt = sY – δK.  Finally, in the initial steady state, I = sY and K = I/(g + 
δ), so that Y/K = (g + δ)/s.  Hence the result in the text. 
30 For example, a typical poverty trap model would feature two stable equilibria. Asymmetries in the 
distance between the state of the economy and each of the two stable equilibria can generate asymmetric   25
accelerations and the monetary instability that occurs with decelerations suggest the need 
for a yet richer and more nuanced theory of the growth process, or, alternatively, that 
reaching for a unified model that captures both accelerations and decelerations may be a 
misleading exercise, as has been argued by Pritchett (2003). 
  The weak role for investment in growth accelerations, and the expansion of trade 
that occurs alongside these accelerations, point towards theories (and policies) that 
emphasize the reallocation of resources. Vested interests, for example, may implement 
protectionist policies that limit trade, inhibit factor reallocation, and prevent the adoption 
of new technologies (Krusell and Rios-Rull 1996, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). 
Opening to international trade, by allowing for a reallocation of resources according to 
comparative advantage, stimulating international knowledge spillovers and learning-by-
doing, and improving within-industry and within-firm productivity through competition, 
can improve efficiency without factor accumulation (see, e.g., Tybout 2000).  Similarly, 
reducing obstacles to internal trade and labor market rigidities, either through changes in 
regulation, avoidance of civil conflict, improved arms-length contracting, or other 
mechanisms, can improve efficiency. The results here suggest that focusing on these 
obstacles to efficient allocation of resources may be more promising than focusing on 
increasing aggregate investment. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
  This paper has presented a number of stylized facts to describe the mechanics of 
start-stop growth. We have shown that dramatic changes in growth are common features 
of the growth experience for many countries. As a result, long-run views of growth, 
including ideas about convergence and poverty traps, may miss an important part of the 
picture. Over substantial periods – ten years or more – the typical poor country has 
proven capable of both rapid expansions and rapid collapse.  If the long-run is the 
summation of a few medium-run experiences, than the difference between a country that 
                                                                                                                                                 
transition dynamics and different probabilities of escaping from each of the two steady states. Models that 
emphasize volatility along the growth path, such as Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) or Aghion et al (2004), 
capture possible key reasoning for starts and stops, and yet do not feature the types of asymmetries found in 
the data.   26
converges and one that stagnates (or worse) over the post-war period may be a single 
break in the growth process. 
  After systematically identifying the dates of growth transitions, we use growth 
accounting to decompose the growth changes into changes in their constituent parts. We 
find that most of the growth transition is due to changes in TFP, with relatively little role 
for changes in capital accumulation (particularly for accelerations) and virtually no role 
for changes in utilization of existing factors. The fact that this exercise can be replicated 
using electricity data suggests that the phenomenon is unlikely to be driven by problems 
in measuring investment. Growth in TFP may therefore be responsible not only for long-
run differences in growth and incomes, as several other papers have argued, but also for 
these shorter run changes in growth, where theory suggests a potentially more prominent 
role for capital accumulation.  We provide several types of evidence – on manufacturing 
employment and trade – that suggest changes in sectoral allocations may be an important 
mechanism behind these changes in TFP. 
  The results also suggest that growth decelerations and accelerations are 
asymmetric events. Accelerations show very little increase in investment, and are 
associated with substantial increases in trade. Declines in growth are associated with 
declines in investment (although these explain only 30% of the growth decline by 
themselves), a reallocation of labor away from manufacturing, increasing inflation, 
devaluation and, in several cases, a rise in internal conflict. 
  The results in this paper suggest two natural next steps. First, as discussed in 
Section 5, focusing on ways to improve the efficient use of resources may be a more 
promising avenue than focusing on increasing aggregate investment in pursuit of 
triggering growth. Second, the ubiquity of growth extremes suggests that the traditional 
empirical approach to growth, which seeks to explain the average level of growth, may be 
a poor description of the actual growth process. Instead, empirical approaches that seek to 
understand the triggers of these long-lasting accelerations and decelerations may be more 
promising.  
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Table 1:  Everybody’s Doing It:  Convergence and Divergence over the Medium Term 
                  
    Convergence over 10-year Period 















Countries  90%   76%  93%  100%   92%  79%  97% 
                  
    Divergence over 10-year Period 



















Countries  94%   100%  89%  81%    100%  92%  97% 
 
               
Country 
Observations  125   42  28  16   37  38  37 
                  
Notes:  Convergence is defined by whether country has average growth rate that is higher than US growth over indicated 
number of years.  Divergence is defined by having lower average growth rate than US.  Growth calculations made from the 
Penn World Tables v6.1.  Countries with less than 20 years of available GDP data are not included in this table.  Observation 
counts by income trecile do not sum to 125 because 13 countries have growth series that begin after 1960. 
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Table 2:  Structural Breaks in Growth 
         
  Year of Break by Type     Year of Break by Type
Country  UP   DOWN    Country  UP DOWN
Algeria   1981   Jamaica  1976  1972
Austria   1974   Japan  1959  1970,  1991
Bangladesh 1973   South  Korea 1962 
Belgium 1958  1974   Luxembourg  1983 
Botswana 1966    Mauritius  1960 
Brazil   1980   Mexico  1995  1981
Burkina Faso  1966    Mozambique  1986  1973
Cameroon 1993  1987   Nicaragua    1977
China  1978    Papua New Guinea  1991  1994
Congo, Dem. Rep.    1974   Philippines  1986  1956, 1981
Cote d'Ivoire    1979   Poland  1981  1977
Ecuador 1971  1977   Portugal 1966  1973
Egypt  1975  1970, 1980   Puerto Rico    1972
El Salvador  1983, 1991  1978   Romania    1985
Equatorial Guinea  1995  1974   Sierra Leone    1990
Finland   1973   South  Africa    1981
France   1973   Spain    1974
Greece   1973   Sweden   1970
Guatemala 1955,  1987  1980   Switzerland   1973
Hungary   1979   Thailand  1955,  1986  1995
Indonesia 1967  1996   Tunisia  1967  1972
Iran 1981  1976   Venezuela    1970
Ireland 1994    Zambia    1964
Italy   1974   Zimbabwe    1976
Notes:  Structural breaks are determined using the Bai and Perron (2003) methodology with a size of 10% and a 
trimming parameter of 10%.   UP breaks are those where the growth rate in the regime after the break is larger than 
in the regime before.  DOWN breaks are the opposite cases.  The break year marks the final year of the prior growth 
regime.   33
 
Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Structural Breaks 
    











Up-Breaks  30  7 11 10 2 
Down-Breaks  43  6 15 18 4 
Total Breaks  73  13  26  28  6 
% of Growth-Year 
Observations  1.4%  0.8% 1.6%  1.5% 1.9% 
         





America  Asia 
Western 
Europe  Other 
Up-Breaks  6 7  9 4  4 
Down-Breaks 9  8  7  10  9 
Total  Breaks  15 15  16 14  13 
% of Growth-Year 
Observations  0.9% 1.3%  2.2% 1.6%  1.5% 
          
  Structural Breaks by Decade 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s  1990s 
Up-Breaks  4 7 5  8  6 
Down-Breaks 1  1  27  9  5 
Total  Breaks  5  8  32 17 11 
% of Growth-Year 
Observations  0.8% 0.7% 2.7%  1.4%  0.9% 
         
Notes:  Structural Breaks are determined by the Bai & Perron (2003) methodology, using tests with 10% 
size and a 10% trimming parameter, as explained in the text.  Up-breaks are those structural breaks where 
growth in the regime after the break is greater than growth before, and down-breaks are defined 
conversely.  The percentage of growth-year observations is the percentage of growth-year observations in 
the designated subgroup (e.g. “Latin America”) where a structural break is detected. 
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Table 4A:  Growth Accounting around Structural Accelerations 
                
    Short-Run (5 Year) Averages  Long-Run (Regime) Averages   
   
Growth Rate in  Before After Change Before After Change  Number of 
Countries 
 











(0.9)  30 













































(0.2)  17 











(0.1)  29 











































(1.2)  17 
 
Contribution to Growth    Percent of Growth 
Change Explained    Percent of Growth 
Change Explained   
 
Capital Accumulation (k)    6.9% 
(3.5)    7.1% 
(4.5)  30 
 
Factor Utilization    -2.8% 
(10.0)    -0.8% 
(9.4)  17 
             
Notes:  Growth accelerations are defined using Bai & Perron methodology, as explained in the text.  The size of the Bai & Perron 
test was set at 10%, and the trimming parameter set to 10%, so that consecutive breaks must be at least 10% of the series length 
in distance from each other.  Growth, imputed capital stocks, and labor force participation data come from the Penn World 
Tables v6.1.  The sub-sample of human capital data comes from Barro & Lee (2000).  The Barro & Lee data is only available at 
five year intervals and for a sub-sample of countries.  The “Short-Run (5 Year) Averages” in this case compare 5-yr growth rates 
for the periods that stand closest to the break but entirely before and after the break.  Electricity consumption data comes from 
the World Development Indicators.  The contribution of various factors to growth are computed assuming a physical capital 
share of 1/3
rd.   Capital stocks are imputed assuming a depreciation rate of 7%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4B:  Growth Accounting around Structural Collapses 
                
    Short-Run (5 Year) Averages  Long-Run (Regime) Averages   
   
Growth Rate in  Before After Change Before After Change  Number of 
Countries 
 











(0.6)  43 













































(0.1)  35 











(0.1)  39 











































(0.6)  34 
 
Contribution to Growth    Percent of Growth 
Change Explained    Percent of Growth 
Change Explained   
 
Capital Accumulation (k)    24.4%
a 
(3.4)    32.3% 
(3.4)  43 
 
Factor Utilization    -1.8% 
(4.1)    -4.6% 
(3.6)  32 
             
a Only 42 observations. 
Notes:  Growth accelerations are defined using Bai & Perron methodology, as explained in the text.  The size of the Bai & Perron 
test was set at 10%, and the trimming parameter set to 10%, so that consecutive breaks must be at least 10% of the series length 
in distance from each other.  Growth, imputed capital stocks, and labor force participation data come from the Penn World 
Tables v6.1.  The sub-sample of human capital data comes from Barro & Lee (2000).  The Barro & Lee data is only available at 
five year intervals and for a sub-sample of countries.  The “Short-Run (5 Year) Averages” in this case compare 5-yr growth rates 
for the periods that stand closest to the break but entirely before and after the break.  Electricity consumption data comes from 
the World Development Indicators.  The contribution of various factors to growth are computed assuming a physical capital 
share of 1/3
rd.   Capital stocks are imputed assuming a depreciation rate of 7%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 5:  Asymmetry Tests 
  UP-BREAKS DOWN-BREAKS  Asymmetry 





Error  P-value Obs  Mean 
Change 
Standard 
Error  P-value Obs  P-value 
   
Growth in                H 0: UP=-DOWN 
k (Capital per capita)  .0144 .0120 .2376 30  -.0464*** .0046  .000 43  .007 
e (Electricity consumption  .0163 .0097 .1122 17  -.0594*** .0049  .000 34  .000 
per capita)                 
                 
Contribution to Growth 
Change                H 0: UP=DOWN 
Factor Accumulation  7.08% 4.52%  .1280 30  32.28%*** 3.39%  .000  43  .000 
Factor Accumulation and   7.33% 13.18%  .5859  17 32.14%*** 3.81%  .000  32  .001 
Utilization                 
                 
Notes.  Results are for regime averages before and after structural growth breaks.  Results for immediate 5-year periods before and after breaks are 
qualitatively similar. 
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Table 6:  Trade and Manufacturing 
  UP-BREAKS DOWN-BREAKS  Asymmetry 





Error  P-value Obs  Mean 
Change 
Standard 
Error  P-value Obs  P-value 
 
Trade Shares (%GDP)                H 0: UP=-DOWN 
Exports  12.2*** 3.4  .001  30  2.0  1.9  .283  43  .002 
Imports  12.8** 5.2  .020 30  0.4  3.0  .886 43  .000 
Exports + Imports  25.1*** 8.3  .005  30  2.5  4.3  .572  43  .021 
Exports - Imports  -0.6 2.9 .837  30 1.6  2.5  .524  43  .796 
                 
Terms of Trade (% change)  6.48 12.2 .599  30 -2.38 6.96 .735  43  .756 
                 
Manufacturing (growth in)                H 0: UP=-DOWN 
Share of Total Population  .036 .024 .151  18  -.048***  .008  .000 32  .564 
   To simple manufacturing  .026 .028 .368  18  -.034***  .008  .000 32  .708 
   To advanced manufacturing  .051*** .018  .010  18 -.072**  .011  .000  32  .289 
Value Added Output  .083* .040  .055 17  -.095*** .017  .000 32  .747 
                 
Notes.  Results are for regime averages before and after structural growth breaks.  Results for immediate 5-year periods before and after breaks are 
qualitatively similar.  Trade shares show more modest increases in the short-run, so that expanding trade shares occur steadily over time.  Terms of 
trade are normalized to be 100 in the year prior to a break; the data is imputed form the Penn World Tables.  Using terms of trade data from the World 
Development Indicators produces similar results.  Manufacturing data comes from the UNIDO INDSTAT3 database.   
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Table 7:  Associated Events 
  UP-BREAKS DOWN-BREAKS Asymmetry 





Error  P-value Obs Mean 
Change 
Standard 
Error  P-value Obs  UP=DOWN  UP=-DOWN 
Prices (growth rates)                   
GDP Deflator  -0.038  0.044  0.400  23  0.141  0.041***  0.002  39  0.007  0.109 
Nominal Exchange Rate  -0.010  0.042  0.814  29  0.146  0.036***  0.000  42  0.007  0.017 
Real Exchange Rate  0.013  0.017  0.445  19  -0.001  0.017  0.955  33  0.582  0.633 
                    
War (level)                   
Any Conflict  -0.108  0.176  0.547  28  0.185  0.118  0.127  40  0.157  0.708 
Internal Conflict  -0.072  0.152  0.641  28  0.275  0.114**  0.021  40  0.067  0.279 
                    
Institutions (level)                   
Rule of Law  0.083  0.054  0.160  10  0.042  0.057  0.492  7  0.620  0.143 
Corruption 0.018  0.054  0.746  10  -0.008  0.047  0.869  7  0.735  0.899 
                    
Notes:  Results are for regime averages before and after structural growth breaks.  Data sources are described in the text. 
  
Table 8A:  Growth Accounting:  Growth Accelerations 
                 
    All Growth Accelerations    Growth Accelerations > 5%   
   
Growth Rate in 
Before After  Change 
Num  
Countries  Before After Change 
Num 
Countries 
0.05 3.44 3.39  124  -2.65  4.69 7.35  24   
y (GDP per-capita) 
(0.26)  (0.23)  (0.24)   (0.5)  (0.55)  (0.4)  
2.9 3.48  0.58 124 2.64  3.46  0.82  24 
k (Capital per capita) 
(0.42)  (0.41)  (0.37)  (1.31)  (1.16)  (1.45)  





















h (Human Capital per 
capita)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2)  
-0.07 0.2 0.27  116 -0.26  0.22  0.48  22 
LFP 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)    (0.13) (0.23) (0.21)   
3.5  4.19 0.68  60  1.41 3.45 2.04  12 
e (Electricity use) 
(0.56) (0.49) (0.58)    (1.28) (0.83) (1.61)   





















Implied k utilization 
(0.5) (0.39)  (0.55)    (1.3) (0.81)  (1.19)   
 
Contribution to Growth       




       2.27% 24    Capital Accumulation 
(k)         (5.33)  
       12.35% 12   
Factor Utilization 
       (5.8)  
                
Notes:  Growth accelerations are defined as the year in each country’s growth history where the average growth rate over the 
ensuing ten years minus the average growth rate in the prior ten years is largest. The second set of results considers the subset of the 
first where this growth acceleration averages at least 5% per annum. Growth, imputed capital stocks, and labor force participation 
data come from the Penn World Tables v6.1.  The sub-sample of human capital data comes from Barro & Lee (2000).  Electricity 
consumption data comes from the World Development Indicators.  The contribution of various factors to growth is computed 
assuming a physical capital share of 1/3
rd.   The contributions to growth are calculated only for large accelerations, since the full set 
includes cases where growth changes are essentially zero, resulting in outliers that drive the averages.   Capital stocks are imputed 
assuming a depreciation rate of 7%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 8B:  Growth Accounting; Growth Decelerations 
                 
    All Growth Decelerations    Growth Decelerations < -5%   
   
Growth Rate in 
Before After  Change 
Num  
Countries  Before After Change 
Num 
Countries 
4.02 -0.46  -4.49  124  4.68 -2.45  -7.14  45   
y (GDP per-capita) 
(0.19)  (0.25)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.27)  
5.04 1.35  -3.69  124  5.1 0.16  -4.94  45 
k (Capital per capita) 
(0.35)  (0.28)  (0.34)  (0.65)  (0.5)  (0.67)  





















h (Human Capital per 
capita)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.4)  (0.2)  (0.4)  
-0.05 0.15  0.2  117  -0.28 0.06 0.34  43 
LFP 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)    (0.09) (0.12) (0.13)   
7.37 2.55  -4.82  74  9.37 1.45  -7.92  24 
e (Electricity use) 
(0.46) (0.35) (0.47)    (1.11) (0.81) (1.09)   





















Implied k utilization 
(0.42) (0.28) (0.48)    (1.08) (0.71) (1.28)   
 
Contribution to Growth       




       22.8%  45    Capital Accumulation 
(k)         (3.2)   
       6.6%  24   
Factor Utilization 
       (5.6)   
                
Notes:  Growth decelerations are defined as the year in each country’s growth history where the average growth rate over the 
ensuing ten years minus the average growth rate in the prior ten years is smallest. The second set of results considers the subset of 
the first where this growth deceleration averages less than -5% per annum. Growth, imputed capital stocks, and labor force 
participation data come from the Penn World Tables v6.1.  The sub-sample of human capital data comes from Barro & Lee (2000).  
Electricity consumption data comes from the World Development Indicators.  The contribution of various factors to growth is 
computed assuming a physical capital share of 1/3
rd.   The contributions to growth are calculated only for large decelerations, since 
the full set includes cases where growth changes are essentially zero, resulting in outliers that drive the averages.  Capital stocks are 
imputed assuming a depreciation rate of 7%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Figure 1:  Amazing Highs, Amazing Lows 
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Figure 2:  Growth Spurts are not Pure Recovery 
Income after Best 10-Yr Growth Episode Relative to Prior GDP Peak 
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